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The president said he was issuing the order to close the facility in order to "restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional values that have made this country great even in the midst of war, even in dealing with terrorism." January 22, 2009.
-President Obama
On 22 January 2009, President Obama issued an executive order calling for the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), detention facility to be closed within one year. The President had been sworn in just a few days before. He immediately launched an ambitious agenda, ranging from health care reform to passing a massive financial package to stimulate a struggling economy. Still, the decision to close GTMO was a top priority; so the executive order to close it was one of President Obama's first acts in office. It has been four years since President Obama signed that executive order directing the closure of detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. Subsequently, despite domestically political and international scrutiny, detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have evolved into the premier detention facility in the world. This Strategy Research Project addresses the evolution of detention operations at GTMO. It weighs the advantages and disadvantages of keeping this most strategic and high profile facility open.
Why GTMO?
United States Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is the oldest U.S. base overseas and the only one in a communist country with which the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations. Located on the southeast corner of Cuba, the base is about 400 miles from Miami, Florida. In February 1903, the United States leased 45 square miles of land and water at Guantanamo Bay to use as a coaling station. As technology advanced, it evolved into a refueling station. In December 1903, the treaty was finalized, and signed in Havana. Another treaty reaffirmed the lease in 1934; it granted Cuba and her trading partners free access through the bay, payment of $2,000 in gold per year ($4,085 today), and required that both the United States and Cuba must mutually consent to terminate the lease. Castro cut off water and supplies to the base in retaliation for several incidents in which Cuban fisherman were fined by the U.S. government for fishing in Florida waters. Since then, Guantanamo Bay has been self-sufficient, and the base desalination plant produces 3.4 kilowatt-hours of electricity daily.
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The base is divided into two separate areas by the 2 ½ mile-wide Guantanamo
Bay. The airfield is located on the leeward side, and the main base is on the windward side. Ferry services provide transportation across the bay. The primary mission of this facility is to serve as a strategic logistics base for the Navy's Atlantic Fleet (fuel and supplies), to support counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, and to serve as the primary location for migrant surge operations in the Caribbean.
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The installation's remote location enables the Department of Defense (DoD) to monitor aircraft flights and control maritime access points, thereby providing an additional layer of security for the detention operations. This unique location gave U.S.
leaders an area to establish a detention facility in a secure and isolated location, deny the detainees any opportunity to rejoin the fight. In addition, this Cuban site allowed U.S. officials to avoid bringing individuals suspected of terrorism onto domestic soil.
The Legal Basis for Detaining Al Qaida and Taliban Combatants
The United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against AlQaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. There is no question that under the law of war the United States has the authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful belligerence for the duration of hostilities, without charges or trial. As with all wars, no one knows when this one will end. Nevertheless, the country may detain combatants until the end of the war. Guantanamo has always been a symbol, rather than the substance, of complaints against the U.S. "war on terror." But it is really the military character of the U.S. response to 9/11 that foreign and domestic critics find unacceptable. Closing the detention facilities will create numerous headaches beyond the security issues raised by domestic housing of dangerous detainees who might escape or serve as a magnet for terrorist attacks in U.S. based facilities. One possible problem is that the Guantanamo detainees may recruit more terrorists from among the federal inmate population and continue Al Qaeda operations from the inside.
A longer term problem is that once Guantanamo is closed, the option of holding captured enemy combatants at any other overseas site will be undermined. Over time, more and more such individuals, including the ones convicted by military commissions, would have to be brought to the U.S. Aggregating the world's worst jihadists on U.S.
soil, from which they can never be repatriated, is not a smart way to fight a war.
Meanwhile, the legality of incarcerating captured terrorists in U.S. domestic prisons is far from clear. Today, the Guantanamo detainees are held under well-established laws of war that permit belligerents to confine captured enemies until hostilities are over. This detention, without the due process accorded criminal defendants, has always been legally justified because it emphatically is not penal in nature. Rather, it is a simple expedient necessary to keep captives from returning to the fight. It was on this basis that the Supreme Court approved the detention of war-on-terror captives, without trial, in inmates. This could mean solitary confinement, perhaps for 23 hours a day, without regard to a detainee's conduct or disciplinary status. The chances are poor that courts would consider this to be the "humane" treatment required by the Geneva conventions.
The Obama administration can be certain these conditions will be challenged in the courts, and it is difficult to see how, in light of current judicial attitudes, the detainees would be denied the entire panoply of constitutional rights claimed by ordinary inmates--including lawsuits challenging their conditions of confinement. If courts conclude that these conditions are unconstitutional, or that they cannot be held indefinitely as enemy combatants, judges could mandate the release of these jihadists into the U.S.
The detainee recidivism rate also plays a big part in the argument to keep the Finally, determination of detainee status greatly affects detainee behavior and, the overall welfare of the camp population. These determinations affect the long-term ability to comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Ultimately, the detention facility at GTMO provides an imperfect solution to a highly complex problem.
Over 82% of all GTMO detainees have already been released; wherever possible, the U.S. government should expedite this process and repatriate those who are no longer 21 believed to pose a substantial threat. At the same time, the accused should appear before some form of court to receive due process. In the end, though, considering the many interests at stake and the absence of good alternatives, this analysis conclude that the GTMO detention facility must remain open for the foreseeable future. As our nation continues to detain these individuals, the administration should seriously consider permitting family visits.
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